Virtue ethics stands as a significant framework in the realm of ethics, with its roots in Western philosophy alongside Kantian deontology and utilitarianism. I contend that the latter two represent misguided paths in ethical reasoning, as they offer less practical guidance compared to virtue ethics.

Deontology and utilitarianism aim to create universal, agent-independent standards for assessing moral actions. Kantian deontology posits that an action is moral if it aligns with the categorical imperative, which urges individuals to act as if their maxims should become universal laws. Conversely, utilitarianism deems an action moral if it enhances overall happiness, as articulated by Bentham's principle of utility, which evaluates actions based on their potential to increase or decrease happiness.

This discourse does not permit a thorough critique of these approaches, but I believe ethics should focus on specific contexts rather than universal rules. More crucially, ethics should prioritize personal growth over impersonal standards or the maximization of happiness, challenging the notion of objective moral judgments.

Interestingly, evidence suggests that the concept of virtue is universally recognized across cultures, albeit with variations in specific virtues and their definitions. This raises the question of whether virtue ethics has emerged outside the Greco-Roman and Christian traditions. To explore this, I will embark on a series examining three major Eastern philosophies—Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism—focusing on scholarly insights into their connections with virtue ethics. While I am not committed to any particular viewpoint, I hope this exploration will shed light on the idea that virtue ethics may indeed be a more universally applicable concept than initially perceived.

Let us begin with Buddhism, guided by the influential essay "Virtue Ethics in Early Buddhism" by Damien Keown, featured in Ethical Theory in Global Perspective. Keown posits that Buddhism can be regarded as a form of virtue eudaimonism, particularly from its inception in the 4th century BCE to the emergence of Mah?y?na Buddhism around the millennium. His analysis draws heavily from the Therav?da canon, the oldest surviving school of Buddhism.

Keown asserts that Buddha, akin to Aristotle, views happiness as the highest good, with virtue playing a vital role in achieving well-being. He uses terms like happiness, eudaimonia, nirvana, and well-being interchangeably throughout his paper, which will become clearer as we progress.

In Buddhism, the supreme good is nirv??a, which is characterized by virtue, and attaining it is a rare achievement. Central to Buddhist doctrine are the Four Noble Truths: i) Suffering (dukkha) is an inherent aspect of human existence; ii) Dukkha arises from desire (ta?h?); iii) Dukkha can be overcome (nirodha) by achieving nirv??a; iv) There exists a path (magga) leading to nirv??a.

Keown suggests that one might mistakenly interpret Buddhism as a form of "negative utilitarianism," focused on reducing suffering. In this view, virtue serves merely as a means to an end, similar to Epicureanism, which is not typically classified as a eudaimonic school. However, Buddhist texts indicate that pursuing practical values without virtue undermines the ultimate goal of nirv??a.

While a cursory reading of the Four Noble Truths may suggest that the Buddhist challenge revolves around suffering (the first truth), the true concern lies with desire (the second truth). Keown translates ta?h? as "ego-driven desire" or "craving." This perspective aligns closely with the Greco-Roman view, framing the dilemma as an emotional-cognitive disorder. The pursuit of false values (vipall?sa) perpetuates the cycle of disappointment known as sa?s?ra. Keown states, "Nirv??a is termed 'the extinction of the vices' (kilesa-parinibb?na) and is defined as 'the end of greed, hatred, and delusion'"—the three fundamental vices.

Progressing toward nirv??a involves gradually substituting the three root vices with the corresponding virtues: unselfishness (ara?ga), benevolence (adosa), and understanding (amoha). Those who attain this transformation are referred to as "saints" (arahant), akin to the Stoic sage. The path to nirv??a (the fourth Noble Truth) comprises eight principles and practices: right view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right meditation.

Keown interprets the eightfold path as encompassing three training domains reminiscent of Epictetus's three disciplines: morality, meditation, and wisdom. Morality, which includes right speech, action, and livelihood, emphasizes self-cultivation, mirroring the first-person, agent-centered perspective of Greco-Roman virtue ethics. Meditation incorporates right effort, mindfulness, and meditation practices. Wisdom pertains to right view and intention.

Keown views these three domains as mutually reinforcing and conceptualizes nirv??a as their intersection. This bears similarity to how Epictetus's disciplines (desire, action, and assent) interact and, when properly practiced, lead to sagehood (though Epictetus himself does not mention sages).

Notably, the Buddhist virtues diverge from Aristotelian ones, partly due to differing cultural understandings of human flourishing. However, Aristotle posits that the ultimate goal of human life must possess three characteristics: it is desirable in itself, all other desires ultimately aim for this goal, and it is not chosen for the sake of anything else. Keown argues that nirv??a fits this framework, supporting the notion that it represents the Buddhist equivalent of eudaimonia.

Historically, Greco-Roman philosophers did not dispute the concept of eudaimonia but rather its specifics. For Aristotle, eudaimonia involves virtue coupled with some external goods, while for the Stoics and Cynics, virtue alone suffices for a meaningful life (with the Cynics asserting that external goods hinder this pursuit). In Buddhism, there have also been historical debates regarding the nature of nirv??a, particularly whether it is primarily a moral, intellectual, or prudential good. The Buddha states:

> "Wisdom (paññ?) is purified by morality (s?la) and morality is purified by wisdom. Where one is, the other is; the moral individual possesses wisdom, and the wise individual embodies morality. This combination of morality and wisdom is deemed the highest in the world. Just as one hand washes the other, so wisdom is refined by morality, and this union is regarded as the utmost in the world." (D?gha Nik?ya, I.124, translated by Maurice Walshe)

Keown interprets this as the Buddha defining "the highest thing in the world" (i.e., eudaimonia) as a synthesis of moral and epistemic goods, notably excluding prudential goods. He notes that Buddhist texts contain several Stoic-like assertions downplaying the significance of external factors. However, similar to the divergence between Stoics and Cynics, the Buddha eventually recognized that extreme self-denial and the rejection of external goods—practices he initially explored—are "a blistering way of practice." Following his awakening, the Buddha is acknowledged to possess various worldly goods, including health, beauty, and longevity, resembling Aristotelian ideals.

In a manner akin to Aristotle, Buddhism teaches that virtue governs the appropriate use of external goods, making virtue necessary but not solely sufficient for happiness. Moreover, as in Greco-Roman eudaimonism, the pursuit of prudential goods as an ultimate aim leads to sa?s?ra rather than nirv??a. Here is a summary table comparing the components of well-being in Aristotelianism and Buddhism:

In concluding the essay, Keown acknowledges several differences between Buddhism and Greco-Roman eudaimonistic traditions, particularly regarding metaphysics. However, he aligns with modern Buddhist scholar Owen Flanagan in asserting that nirv??a and eudaimonia belong to the broader category of "natural teleologies." Keown concludes:

> "If the Four Noble Truths are understood as proposed in this essay, the motivation for attaining nirv??a shifts from mere suffering avoidance to the pursuit of excellence. In Buddhism, as in Aristotle’s view, this pursuit of excellence encompasses social engagement, exemplified in the Buddha's decision to teach the Dhamma (i.e., natural law) and the noble quest of the bodhisattva to aid all sentient beings."

[Next: Confucianism as virtue ethics?]