Understanding Merleau-Ponty: Phantom Limbs and Our Existence
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The amputee reaches out, attempting to grasp something that is no longer there. His once familiar hand and arm have vanished, yet in an uncanny manner, they still linger in his consciousness. The sensation of the absent limb haunts him, reflecting a struggle to relinquish the familiar motions that shaped his daily interactions.
This experience transcends mere mental tricks; it is a profound reality for him. The loss of his limb has disrupted the seamless flow of his actions and perceptions, creating a void that is palpable. However, in the midst of this struggle, he begins to adapt, learning to navigate the world with his remaining limb, gradually incorporating new tools and techniques into his bodily awareness.
This complex interplay of absence and presence reveals a remarkable resilience in his embodied consciousness. Merleau-Ponty, in his work The Phenomenology of Perception (1945), emphasizes the significance of the body, examining what he terms "phenomenal disorders." The phantom limb phenomenon, where an amputee perceives their lost limb as still present, serves as a poignant example.
Merleau-Ponty critiques previous explorations of such phenomena, which he categorizes into two primary frameworks: (1) empiricism and physiology, and (2) intellectualism and psychology. He argues that both approaches fail to adequately explain these disorders. Instead, he posits that they must be understood through the lens of our existence in the world, emphasizing a pre-reflective, embodied engagement that exists prior to any subject-object distinction. A phenomenological approach, focusing on first-person experiences, can illuminate what it means to be a person within these contexts.
By examining deficiencies in our being and challenging existing explanations, we can gain deeper insights into our existence. This existential inquiry helps clarify the nature of being, as recognizing and accepting these disorders can lead to the development of new habits that further enrich our understanding.
The phantom limb phenomenon is intricately linked to Merleau-Ponty's views on perception, motor intentionality, and the concept of the "intentional arc." For him, perception is an active, embodied engagement rather than a passive reception of sensory data, shaped by our motor skills and past experiences.
Our body serves not just as an object in the world but as the means through which we experience it. The intentional arc encapsulates how our past, skills, and intentions influence our present perception and actions. With the phantom limb, this arc is disrupted; the amputee's habitual engagement with the world is projected forward, giving rise to the phantom's ambiguous presence.
Merleau-Ponty identifies two conflicting and inadequate explanations of the phantom limb phenomenon. The first, rooted in empirical and physiological analysis, attempts to explain the phantom limb solely through bodily mechanisms, neglecting the mind. He finds this reductionist approach problematic, as it overlooks the inseparability of body and mind in the experience of consciousness.
He argues that the experience of the phantom limb occurs within the realm of consciousness, where psychological factors undeniably play a role, rendering a purely physiological explanation insufficient. The notion that cerebral traces alone could encapsulate the consciousness involved is inadequate.
Merleau-Ponty critiques the psychological perspective as well, which often seeks to interpret the phantom limb as a mere mental disorder, ignoring the physiological factors at play. He emphasizes that the existence of the limb's absence is crucial to understanding the phenomenon, as it cannot be dismissed as solely experiential.
His exploration leads to the idea that both physiological and psychological analyses miss the mark because they fail to bridge the gap between mind and body. He asserts that for both sets of conditions to co-determine the phenomenon, a common ground must exist, yet the two realms remain fundamentally incompatible.
Attempts to reconcile these perspectives often lead to obscurity. Psychology posits that the phantom limb represents a presence in the mind, while physiology sees it as a representation that exists objectively. These contradictory views highlight the limitations of both approaches.
Merleau-Ponty asserts that the phantom limb embodies more than mere representation; it signifies an ambivalent presence of an absent limb. The language of representation fails to capture the directness of our engagement with the world.
Nevertheless, some common ground exists between psychology and physiology, as physiological events undoubtedly coincide with psychological experiences. Merleau-Ponty identifies this commonality as our being in the world, where practical engagement and meaning shape our experiences.
His concept of the intentional arc ties together our experiences and actions, allowing for coordination between sensory and motor functions. In the case of the phantom limb, this arc remains partially intact, projecting actions and experiences associated with the missing limb. The amputee’s being in the world is shaped by years of experience, which does not immediately adapt to the new reality of their loss.
Merleau-Ponty notes that those experiencing phantom limbs often display denial regarding their amputation. They may reference their missing limb in ways that suggest a refusal to accept the absence, highlighting an ontological struggle rather than a psychological one. The habitual engagement with the world, which previously involved the limb, persists despite its physical absence.
This persistence further elucidates the concept of intentional arc. The amputee's perceptual and motor habits continue to anticipate the presence of the missing limb, reflecting their longstanding relationship with it. The world still appears familiar, as their existence has long been structured around the limb's presence.
Ultimately, the significance of the limb remains; otherwise, the phantom phenomenon would not exist. The denial of injury, therefore, plays a crucial role in conjuring this presence.
Merleau-Ponty draws a parallel between the phantom limb and pareidolia, where one may perceive the face of a friend in a stranger, reflecting a deeper human loneliness and an unconscious denial of absence. Just as the phantom limb represents a refusal to accept the loss of a physical presence, pareidolia embodies a refusal to acknowledge the absence of social connections.
Both experiences disrupt the intentional arc, revealing the existential dimension of being in the world. Our engagement with others is fundamental, and losing significant relationships disrupts our habitual ways of interacting with the world.
Analyzing the phantom limb and similar existential disorders underscores the importance of our engagement with familiar environments. When this familiarity is disrupted, ambiguity arises regarding our place in the world, leading to the presence of significations that no longer exist.
The journey towards understanding these existential disorders involves accepting one’s new place in the world. Phantom limbs do not typically occur in those who embrace their injuries, signaling the possibility of finding equilibrium through acceptance.
Merleau-Ponty concludes that by relinquishing a part of our spontaneity, we can acquire the mental and practical space needed to engage with the world anew. This acceptance may manifest as adopting new habits, extending beyond mere physical adaptations to encompass a broader engagement with the world’s significations.
He asserts that the body is not merely an object of thought but a totality of lived experiences striving towards balance. Thus, both the amputee who accepts their situation through prosthetics and the individual who cherishes existing relationships after loss can find a sense of equilibrium by enriching their bodily and social synthesis.
Accepting new habits can thus be seen as reconfiguring the intentional arc. By letting go of the past and engaging with the world through new means, the amputee can reshape their perceptual and motor intentionality in alignment with their circumstances.
This process is not solely intellectual; it requires an embodied adjustment of one’s bodily habits and postural schema. Merleau-Ponty's exploration of phantom limbs critiques traditional theories of perception while offering a positive vision of human beings as engaged, embodied entities.
The phantom limb phenomenon reveals the depth of our bodily existence in the world, where our experiences and actions are shaped by our embodied history. At the same time, it highlights the potential for reshaping this intentional arc and discovering new ways of being in the face of loss.
References
Crick, Francis. The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1994.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by Donald A. Landes. London: Routledge, 2012.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. “Thus Spoke Zarathustra.” In The Portable Nietzsche, translated and edited by Walter Kaufmann, 103–439. New York: Viking Press, 1954.