Exploring Free Will Through Scientific Metaphysics
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Chapter 1: The Conventional View of Free Will
The typical narrative regarding free will posits that, for those who embrace naturalism—eschewing the existence of deities—and who genuinely consider the principles of cause and effect, free will is merely an illusion. However, can this conventional perspective withstand critical examination? To explore this, we will delve into the concluding chapter of Scientific Metaphysics, a work edited by Don Ross, James Ladyman, and Harold Kincaid, which seeks to present a counter-narrative to the analytic metaphysics that has led to concepts like philosophical zombies and panpsychism.
The chapter, titled "Causation, Free Will, and Naturalism," is authored by Jenann Ismael from Columbia University. While her analysis is framed within the context of Newtonian mechanics, her reasoning is equally applicable within the frameworks of General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics.
Section 1.1: The Dilemma of Free Will
Ismael asserts that the so-called issue of free will stems from the laws of nature, which theoretically allow for the prediction of our actions if the initial conditions of the universe were known. The fact that we lack this knowledge is inconsequential; the implication remains. This reasoning echoes sentiments from individuals like Sam Harris, physicist Lawrence Krauss, and biologist Jerry Coyne, who often discuss free will without a firm grasp of the underlying complexities.
Ismael emphasizes that insights from science regarding causality challenge the "folk" understanding of cause and effect, making conversations about free will more intricate, with conclusions that are far from definitive. Her chapter illustrates the shift from analytic metaphysics—rooted in everyday concepts—to scientific metaphysics, which draws its concepts from empirical science.
Section 1.2: Historical Context of Causation
Ismael begins with a concise history of causation, noting that an intuitive grasp of causality is vital for survival, as understanding cause-effect relationships can be crucial. Science itself serves to systematize our comprehension of these relationships, which are then applied to a multitude of specific scientific inquiries.
With Newton's introduction of physical laws, the link between cause and effect appeared to loosen. In physics, laws are expressed as differential equations that detail the rates of change of certain variables over time. For instance, consider Newton’s second law of motion:
F = m a
In this equation, F represents force, m denotes mass, and a indicates acceleration. Notably, understanding this law does not necessitate discussions of causation. The relationship among these three quantities is entirely symmetrical; causal discussions inherently involve a temporal aspect, where causes precede effects. However, this asymmetry is absent in equations such as Newton's.
Ismael quotes Bertrand Russell, who dismissed causation as a pre-scientific concept, arguing that it persists only due to a false assumption of its harmlessness. Russell's critique, while valid regarding monarchy, falls short concerning causation. Philosopher Nancy Cartwright counters Russell, asserting that dynamical laws cannot replace causal understanding in scientific contexts, as they lack the necessary information for manipulating physical systems.
The video "Re: Re: Free will my ass!" discusses the philosophical implications of free will and causation, providing a deeper understanding of these concepts.
Section 1.3: The Limits of Dynamical Laws
For instance, while it is a matter of physical law that there exists a strong correlation between bad breath and cancer (since smoking induces bad breath), it is misleading to claim that bad breath causes cancer. This distinction between correlation and causation is often overlooked in dynamical laws. Understanding causation entails the ability to influence a system to achieve specific outcomes, such as preventing cancer.
The interventionist perspective on causation suggests that a system's causal structure conveys information about the outcomes of hypothetical interventions. Philosophers refer to these hypothetical scenarios as counterfactuals, exploring "if... then" situations. In reality, individual variables cannot be isolated from a complex web of causes and effects, except through our selective focus on certain elements.
Chapter 2: Causal Thinking and Human Agency
To illustrate, consider a drunk driver causing an accident. It’s intuitive to attribute the accident to the driver’s decision to drink and drive. However, multiple co-factors contributed to the incident, including another driver crossing the intersection and environmental conditions. Our focus on human choice leads to the conclusion that drinking caused the accident, yet this perspective is shaped by our human priorities.
Ismael observes that the interventionist account of causality offers a richer modal structure than that derived from dynamical laws. Modal logic examines necessary and contingent truths, while dynamical laws only address how a system’s history might change based on different initial conditions. Causal accounts, however, are richer in their implications.
Importantly, Ismael clarifies that there is no logical conflict between dynamical laws and interventionist counterfactuals; they simply operate at different levels and provide different details. While we cannot construct a comprehensive causal model for the entire universe, we can glean considerable understanding from dynamical laws. Conversely, dynamical laws may not clarify the causal relationships in specific scenarios, such as smoking and cancer or drinking and driving.
Ismael concludes that "free will," interpreted as the segment of cause and effect focused on human agency, can coexist with deterministic laws. The decisions to continue or cease smoking, or whether to drive while intoxicated, are counterfactuals that do not contradict any dynamical laws, yet necessitate an understanding of causality.
In essence, Ismael’s analysis underscores that causal reasoning serves as a cognitive tool, allowing us to navigate the interconnected components of a system for strategic action rather than as an inherent force in nature dictating outcomes. Far from negating freedom, the existence of causal pathways fosters the emergence of will, enabling effective choices based on the information available to us.
In summary, what emerges from Ismael’s examination of scientific metaphysics diverges significantly from the folk interpretation of free will. Analytic metaphysicians often seek to uphold pre-theoretical notions, whereas scientific metaphysicians assert that if scientific findings conflict with these intuitions, it is the intuitions that must be revised.
Ismael’s work exemplifies the essence of scientific metaphysics, emphasizing that there is no science-independent framework for engaging with metaphysical questions. Effective metaphysics requires integrating relevant scientific insights into philosophical inquiries, as any other approach risks being futile.