The recent evaluation from the EU’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) on hydrogen's role in transportation has revealed some striking conclusions. It was stated that fuel cell vehicles (FCEVs) cannot compete with battery electric vehicles (BEVs), yet the report surprisingly calls for additional funding to support FCEVs.

> “Both FCEVs and FCEBs face competition from battery electric alternatives, which benefit from lower operational costs and advancements in technology.”

Since 2008, over €1.2 billion has been invested in hydrogen projects, but issues like the reliability of vehicles and refueling stations remain unresolved. Meanwhile, battery electric vehicles have consistently demonstrated greater reliability and lower costs. An honest reflection might suggest, "Batteries have triumphed; it's time to halt hydrogen initiatives for transportation." Instead, the report seeks increased financial backing, expanded infrastructure, and funding for pro-hydrogen messaging.

The report titled Historical Analysis of Clean Hydrogen JU Fuel Cell Electric Vehicles, Buses and Refueling Infrastructure Projects: Evaluation of Contribution towards the State of the Art reflects a disconnect from reality, much like other recent evaluations involving hydrogen in transportation.

Do you doubt the €1.2 billion figure?

Let's clarify: every cent spent on fuel cell vehicles has been wasted. Over a quarter of a billion euros has been essentially thrown away. Despite incentives, companies like Toyota and Hyundai are offering significant discounts and free hydrogen refueling for new cars, yet demand remains stagnant. This has been evident for years, yet investments in hydrogen taxi programs and light vehicle refueling stations persist.

Interestingly, the JRC's recommendation for increased funding presents much lower figures, citing €240 million on page 8 of their recent report. The larger figures are drawn from the EU's Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking 2023 program review.

So, what is the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking? It’s the rebranded version of the previous Fuel Cells and Hydrogen Joint Undertakings. The rationale behind the name change is unclear, especially since the mission appears unchanged. This mission does not seem to include competing subsidies with battery electric vehicles unless one stretches the interpretation significantly.

> 2. It shall, in particular aim to: > (a) reduce the production cost of fuel cell systems for transport applications while enhancing their lifespan to levels competitive with conventional technologies, > (b) enhance the electrical efficiency and durability of fuel cells used for power production to levels that can compete with conventional technologies, while lowering costs.

These conventional technologies refer to diesel, LNG, and CNG, not battery electric. Nonetheless, the JRC correctly identifies battery electric transportation as the competition, as BEVs are clearly outpacing fuel cell vehicles across various metrics.

The Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking includes members such as the European Union, represented by the European Commission, the hydrogen and fuel cell industries represented by Hydrogen Europe, and the research community represented by Hydrogen Europe Research.

This composition reveals a bias, as two out of three major groups actively advocate for hydrogen, explaining the odd conclusions and the requests for additional funds. Without hydrogen transportation initiatives, these organizations may face significant challenges in maintaining their relevance.

What else does the assessment report reveal about the EU's €1.2 billion expenditure? There are indeed notable findings.

Reliability issues permeate the document, as multiple projects strive to enhance the reliability of fuel cell drivetrains and refueling stations to a functional level.

The assessment data from a hydrogen garbage truck initiative is particularly intriguing. Their target was to achieve 3,500 kilometers before a fuel cell drivetrain failure—an unreasonably low goal—yet they only managed a mere 785 kilometers. This is insufficient for even two weeks of garbage truck operation.

The report highlights the following:

> “In transport applications, a cost of around €5/kg at the pump must be achieved for cost parity with conventional fuels.”

Currently, refueling stations in Europe are offering gray hydrogen at prices ranging from €15-€25 per kilogram. Before this, the cheapest hydrogen was around €10.

Recent reports from BCG indicate that achieving green hydrogen production at that cost through large-scale electrolysis may be implausible, projecting a price range of €5-€8 by 2030, with expectations leaning towards the upper end. Given that the average price for green hydrogen contracts in 2023 was €9.49, the feasibility of reducing the delivered, stored, compressed, cleansed, and dispensed cost of low-carbon hydrogen to €5 raises significant concerns.

Does the review state, "We cannot achieve this, so let's stop pretending we can"? No, it does not. Should it assert, "Battery electric drive trains already fall below this cost for energy, so we should abandon hydrogen"? No, it should, but it does not.

> 3EMOTION has deployed all 29 FCBs: 10 buses in London, 6 in Rotterdam and the South Holland province, 7 in Versailles, 3 in Pau, and 3 in Aalborg, demonstrating the operability of buses from 4 different manufacturers with 2 different fuel cell systems. The buses in some locations of 3EMOTION met targets for hydrogen consumption (average of 8 kg H2/100 km), warranty time (15,000 hours), and cost (< €850,000).

3EMOTION is one of the ventures funded by the program. Out of 29 fuel cell buses, which constitute over 10% of all fuel cell buses in Europe, only a few managed to achieve warranties lasting 20 months and costs that are not exorbitant.

In comparison, Yutong's battery electric buses are priced below €400,000 and come with 8-year warranties. Leading European electric bus manufacturer Solaris offers its electric buses with five years of maintenance for €650,000. This stark contrast explains why there are ten times more battery electric buses on European roads than fuel cell buses, despite the vast financial resources the EU allocates to hydrogen.

Does the review indicate, "Hydrogen buses are significantly more expensive and less reliable than battery electric buses; therefore, we should cease funding them"? No, it does not, but it should.

The goals for the €32 million H2HAUL initiative are a mix of ambitious and unrealistic.

A target of 99% uptime for hydrogen refueling stations? However, empirical data from California’s light vehicle and bus refueling stations indicate that they are out of service more hours than they are operational, primarily due to compressor failures. This target is unattainable. Although the JRC report was supposed to include data on hydrogen refueling stations, it notably lacks information on their maintenance costs.

A dispensing cost of €7.50 per kilogram of hydrogen, excluding taxes? The H2HAUL site is ambiguous about whether they will be supplying gray or green hydrogen. They are likely to fall short of this target as well.

A budget of €32 million for 16 trucks and four refueling stations? The same funding could potentially cover three times as many battery electric trucks with megawatt-scale chargers for perhaps €12 million, even if they were gold-plated.

An emissions target only 50% better than that of a diesel truck? Given that full lifecycle emissions for battery electric trucks are already about 40% of those for diesel and declining rapidly as the grid and supply chains decarbonize?

A mean distance between failures exceeding 2,500 kilometers? This translates to less than three days of driving for long-haul trucks. Is this the goal—to simply surpass an entirely unacceptable standard?

Does the JRC report provide insights on vehicle reliability?

Indeed, it does address this, albeit with an overly optimistic interpretation of the poor data. Why poor? The chart shows a target maintenance cost of around €0.40 per kilometer. Most fleets exceed this target significantly. The JRC claims this reflects a decrease in maintenance costs over the years, yet the data does not support such a trend.

This information corroborates findings from California’s bus fleets, which incur maintenance costs approximately 50% higher than those of diesel buses—data that continues to be overlooked in total cost of ownership analyses for heavy-duty vehicles. I could not locate a report that provided a directly comparable value for the JRC chart, as diesel bus maintenance includes comprehensive engine overhauls every seven years, which was not relevant for fuel cell buses given their limited lifespan.

The hydrogen mobility project H2ME 2 caught my attention due to its claims of 98% availability of hydrogen refueling stations, which starkly contrasts the empirical and anecdotal evidence I have gathered over recent months from various countries.

My initial investigation of California’s light vehicle refueling stations revealed they were out of service for 2,000 more hours than they dispensed hydrogen, indicating a 20% higher downtime than usage, with projected costs potentially reaching 30% of capital expenditure annually. I have suggested that European researchers reassess this with a formal report and more rigorous methodology to arrive at a more accurate figure than the 3% to 4% commonly referenced in total cost of ownership studies.

Given the high estimates, I consulted the H2ME 2 website for detailed reports on their outcomes.

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In light of the absence of any corroborating data for H2ME's claims in the overarching document, as well as the lack of quantifiable metrics on refueling station reliability in the JRC report, my conclusion that hydrogen refueling stations are empirically unreliable remains unchanged. If anyone possesses actual results from H2ME 2, I would greatly appreciate reviewing them. As it stands, I find the 98% claim unsupported and indefensible, particularly in light of the compressor failures witnessed in California.

The IMMORTAL program, focused on fuel cell durability in heavy-duty trucks, has yielded intriguing results as well.

Note the 8,500 hours with a 10% degradation rate. This barely surpasses a quarter of the target lifespan.

Assuming a 12-hour workday for the truck, this equates to only two years of operation, and a full replacement may be necessary within four years at a considerable cost.

Moreover, their findings on membrane durability achieved in lab conditions have not been replicated in real-world scenarios: “No public result comes close to this number of cycles.” Indeed, I verified on the IMMORTAL website that these results pertain solely to laboratory settings.

This reflects TRL4 or 5 stages of development, and it may never be suitable for on-road, urban air fuel cell applications.

The JIVE program, which promotes fuel cell buses, initiated in 2017, has not produced any quantitative results against its targets except for achieving a capital expenditure below €650,000 for some buses.

With a budget of €89 million spread across eight locations, it presumes the establishment of eight hydrogen refueling stations alongside 142 buses.

For the same budget, three times the number of battery electric buses could have been deployed across 24 locations.

Once again, after seven years, there are no results regarding availability from the program, and a mere 2,500 kilometers driven between failures sets an alarmingly low benchmark. Transit buses typically cover about 130 km daily, suggesting that the goal is merely to avoid having them out of service every 19 days, which would amount to nearly 20 days a year.

Diesel bus data indicates an average of 11,000 km as the baseline. While data for battery electric buses varies—due to early poor performance from companies like Proterra—they still significantly outperform the targets set for fuel cell buses and, in many instances, are proving to be lower maintenance than diesel buses, with most issues linked to ancillary components like doors rather than the drivetrains.

Moreover, initiatives in maritime shipping, trains, and aviation are stagnating, lacking any quantitative progress despite €130 million in investments.

What do these findings indicate overall?

The JRC and the 2023 Clean Hydrogen JU reports are chronicles of costly failures, stagnation in making hydrogen viable, and financial drains on EU taxpayers. Any comparisons that include battery electric options lead to the conclusion articulated by the JRC: batteries outperform hydrogen in every aspect.

If these conclusions weren't being drafted by organizations so committed to hydrogen that they fail to perceive glaring red flags or hear urgent alarms, they should recommend that the EU cease funding hydrogen initiatives for transportation due to their ineffectiveness. Instead, they continue to request even more financial support and resources.